Moral Distinctions Not Derived from Reason
[…](W)e may observe, that our actions never cause any judgment, either true or false, in ourselves, and that it is only on others they have such an influence. It is certain, that an action, on many occasions, may give rise to false conclusions in others; and that a person, who through a window sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my neighbour’s wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own. In this respect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falshood; only with this difference, which is material, that I perform not the action with any intention of giving rise to a false judgment in another, but merely to satisfy my lust and passion.
(David Hume – A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739)



Üks vastus to “mõttetoitu”

  1. cabaretinterruptus Says:

    ..inglise keel on ka ilus keel, aga kui keegi viitsib, võib selle ka tõlkega asendada

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